Iraq Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Summer-Fall 2003

Types of violence, 2003

Looting, April

Criminal Gangs, May onward

Anti-American insurgency, Summer-Fall 2003

G. W. Bush, ”War on Terror” (Anderson, p. 169)

Riverbend/Iraqis, “Resistance” against U.S. troops vs. “Terrorism” against civilians (Anderson, p. 179; Riverbend, pp. 9-10)

What is an insurgency? Why does an anti-American insurgency begin to develop in Iraq by Summer of 2003?

*Insurgency or “Resistance”

Political-Military Reactions to Perceived Oppression

Native government (Syria, 2011-present)

✓Foreign occupation (Iraq, 2003-2011)

3 Elements of Insurgency (weightings according to William Polk)

✓Politics, 80%

Arming, financing, recruiting

✓Warfare, 15%

Administration, 5%

Islamic State, 2014-2019 in Western Iraq and Easter Syria

Taliban in Afghanistan, August 2021-present

✓=Relevant to Iraq in 2003-2011

Insurgency vs. Terrorism

*“War on Terrorism” in Iraq?

Iraqi definitions of "terrorism" (Anderson p. 179, Riverbend, pp. 121-22)

Insurgency or “Resistance”

Political-Military reaction to perceived oppression by stronger power within country

Military strategy/tactics of insurgency

*Guerrilla warfare against hard targets (compare with Conventional warfare)

Military of occupier

Military tactic

Terrorism against soft targets

Viewed as politically aligned with occupier (Red Cross, U.N., members of IGC, etc.)

Political tactic

Iraq's Insurgency

Hard targets

U.S. Troops

Soft targets

U.N. Mission

Aid organizations

Iraqi allies of U.S.

Anderson 168-80; Riverbend, 70-75, 117-30, 231-5, 246-63

According to Anderson and Riverbend, what people are involved in the insurgency or “resistance”? Who do they identify as the “terrorists”?

How do the two groups differ in their political goals and military tactics?

What counterinsurgency tactics did the U.S. military initially employ in Iraq?

Why did the raid of Abu A.'s house create a Type II cultural incident and have such a powerful effect on Riverbend (pp. 70-5)?

According to Riverbend, how effective are the interrogation, prison and justice systems (pp. 231-5, 258-63)?

How did Riverbend react to the Battle of Fallujah (Falloojeh) and abuses at Abu Ghraib (Riverbend, pp. 246-55, also see Anderson, pp. 173-178)?

Anti-American Insurgents

*Secular nationalists

Ex-Iraqi military and Ba'th party members

*Religious nationalists

Sunni extremists

Al-Qaeda external support

Shi'ite extremist militias

Iranian external support

Insurgency & Counterinsurgency, Fall 2003

Iraqi insurgent tactics

*IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices)

Mortars

Assassinations

Suicide bombings (Sunni extremists)

Civilian, governmental, and Shi'ite religious sites

Executions of hostages (Sunni extremists)

*Counter-insurgency (U.S. Army and Marines)

House-to-house raids

Checkpoints

Patrols

Counterinsurgency tactics alienate Iraqis

Minimal Arabic language & cultural training

Lack of good intelligence (Riverbend, p. 231-5)

“American troops were and blind deaf to much of what was going on around them…and the Iraqis were often terrified.” (NPR reporter Anne Garrels, quoted in Anderson, p. 171)

Lack of functioning judicial system

Abu Ghraib Prison (Riverbend, p. 231-5, 258-63)

US military truck brings hooded prisoners into Abu Ghraib prison, 35km west of Baghdad, 08 January 2004